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1 Introduction
The Palestinian state-formation process is at a dead end. Officially the process started
with the signing of the first Oslo Agreement in Washington on 13 September 1993,
followed by the famous handshake between the PLO leader Yassar Arafat, the late
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. It ended – at
least for the foreseeable future - by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple
Mount, which ignited in late September 2000 a popular uprising known as the al-Aqsa
intifada in the occupied territories and inside Israel.1
The road from Oslo to al-Aqsa has certainly been a dramatic one, in terms of
bloodshed, hopes and despair on both sides of the conflict. The Oslo Agreement was a
declaration of principles which laid the foundation for a limited, interim Palestinian
self-rule in those areas of Palestine occupied by Israel since 1967; the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.2 This included approximately 20% of the
Palestine that the United Nations decided to separate into two states in 1947
(Butenschøn, 1998:19).
The Oslo Agreement was not an agreement between equal partners, but an agreement
between an occupying power and an occupied people. However, for Palestinians the
new reality after Oslo involved the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
in 1994 with some jurisdiction over the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip (Giacaman, 1998:1). Moreover, the agreement included the establishment of an
elected Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) with executive and legislative authority
constrained by the agreement.
Although the PNA operated over only a small part of the territory of the WBGS, it had
a degree of sovereign legitimacy within the Palestinian territories. In the period 1994-
2000, the PNA set up institutions which were intended gradually to form the core of a
future Palestinian state (Hilal & Khan, 2002:1). The PNA established state institutions
such as ministries and agencies, it had its own police force, a tax system was developed,
and it received foreign aid from both multi- and bilateral donors. However, the second
intifada and the Israeli re-occupation of major parts of the West Bank during spring
2002 have put further progress on hold.3
The turmoil that began in late September 2000 has caused a collapse of the Palestinian
economy. Moreover, during the Israeli re-occupation in 2002 much of the PNA’s
                                           
1 The al-Aqsa Mosque, located at the Temple Mount, was built by the Caliph al-Walid (r. 705-715) of
the Umayyad dynasty. It is one of the three most revered places of worship for Muslims, and a major
religious and educational centre. Moreover, it is a showcase for Islamic architecture and design from
Umayyad to Ottoman times.
2 Actually, there were two Israeli-Palestinian agreements referred to as Oslo I (signed in September 1993)
and Oslo II (signed in September 1995). See Butenschøn (1998) for an analysis of the Oslo Agreements
placed in the context of Israeli and Palestinian political strategies. Giacaman & Lønning (1998) provide
a critical assessment of the Oslo process from various perspectives.
3 After a series of suicide bombings, the Israeli army invaded and re-occupied Palestinian population
centres on the West Bank. The military occupation lasted for 3-4 weeks (29 March to 21 April 2002).
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administrative and physical infrastructure on the West Bank was destroyed.4 Real per
capita gross national income (GNI) has fallen sharply since 1999 (Fischer et al., 2001).5
According to the United Nations, three-quarters of all production in the West Bank has
come to a halt, and three-quarters of the workforce is temporarily or permanently
unemployed. Few have cash and their savings are exhausted. Moreover, aside from the
Israeli invasions, the 40% of the West Bank that the PNA once partially controlled is
currently divided into eight zones, 120 checkpoints and 220 enclaves (The Economist
29 June 2002:27).
It is clear that no functioning, central Palestinian Authority, reformed or otherwise, can
emerge in these circumstances. But although the events since autumn 2000 have put
further progress on hold, the experiences of the PNA during the period 1994-2000
provide valuable evidence about the nature of state-society relationships in Palestine.
Moreover, the experiences of state building from this period may provide important
lessons about the economic, political and institutional constraints that a future
Palestinian state might face.
We use the tax system as an entry point to analyse the state-formation process. The
relevance of the tax system in this respect lies in fact that tax revenues are central to (i)
building state capacity and service delivery; (ii) the shaping of state-society relations;
and (iii) the sustainability of aid interventions. Furthermore, based on historical
evidence from the West, the way a state tackles the issue of domestic revenue
mobilisation significantly influences its potential for economic growth and democratic
consolidation (Tilly, 1992).
This report analyses the evolution of the tax system in the Palestinian territories
governed by the Palestinian National Authority during the period 1994-2000. In
particular, it explores the political, institutional and economic forces that shaped the
tax system. The tax system during this period reflects, we assume, the impacts of and
changes in four main constraints when seeking to increase revenues: These constraints
relate to (a) the socio-economic structures of Palestine; (b) the nature and capacity of
the political and administrative institutions of government; (c) the PNA’s bargaining
position vis-à-vis various groups of citizens; and (d) the international context, here
defined as the external actors and institutions that affect the PNA’s economic policies.
Of particular relevance are the Israeli-Palestinian linkages and foreign aid.
The study is organised as follows: The following section briefly describes the economic
structure and tax system in Palestine in the period 1994-2000. In section 3 various
theoretical approaches to analysing the constraints facing a state’s revenue policies are
                                           
4 In Ramallah, for instance, Israeli soldiers, in a pattern so routine that it seemed to observers to be
policy, invaded PNA ministries, removed land registries of maps, raided courts, broke into banks and
stole money, and trashed non-governmental offices servicing health, human rights and commerce. In the
Ministry of Finance in Ramallah the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) confiscated and/or destroyed hard disks
containing tax records, payroll schemes, financial records and accounts (LACC, 2002; PNEIJ, 2002).
Similar confiscations and damages of hard disks and data files were reported from the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics. For detailed accounts of the damages caused by the IDF during the re-
occupation, see Press Release of the ‘Local aid co-ordination committee co-chairs’ [LACC] (15 May
2002); and PNEIJ (2002).
5 The International Monetary Fund estimated real GNI per capita growth in 2000 to minus 8.3%
(Fischer et al., 2001:Table 1).
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discussed, including the role of domestic and external interest groups. In the main
analysis in section 4 these constraints are analysed within the context of the post-Oslo
accord. A concluding section summarises the main arguments and points to possible
lessons for future developments of the taxing powers of a Palestinian state. Moreover,
a detailed description of the Palestinian tax system is presented in the appendix.
C M I
4
2 Economic structure and the tax system
In the period 1994-2000 the PNA was a self-government that possessed administrative,
legislative and political power over only parts of its territory. About a third of the area
of the Gaza Strip (GS) and around 60% of the West Bank (WB) were controlled by
Israel. However, the majority of the population of more than 3 million people came
under the jurisdiction of the PNA, except from those living in East Jerusalem and some
villages in the West Bank that were under Israeli security control. With a GDP per
capita income of USD 1387 (in 1998), Palestine fell into the category of middle-income
countries (PCBS, 1999).6 However, since the second Intifada started in September
2000, living conditions in WBGS deteriorated dramatically. Real GDP per capita has
now reached its lowest level since 1980. By the end of year 2000, 35% of the
population lived below the poverty line, a figure that was expected to rise to over 50%
by the end of 2001.7 The official unemployment rate was 14.5% in 2000. But, when
including workers discouraged from entering or remaining in the labour force the
unemployment rate was estimated to almost 40% in the last quarter of 2000.
2.1 Economic policy and employment
The PNA implemented and maintained a liberal economic policy regime, emphasising
incentives for investments and a stable macroeconomic environment. At the same time,
the public sector expanded rapidly. Total public expenditures accounted for more than
27% of GDP in 1999, compared to 14.7% when the PNA was established (Fischer et
al., 2001:256). This expansion was mainly due to an almost four-fold increase in
public sector employees, including security forces (from 31,140 in 1994 to
approximately 110,000 in mid-2000), and provision of social services to health care
and education. The PNA used public office holding as a reward for political and
personal loyalty, and as a mechanism of incorporation and stabilisation of the regime
(Hilal & Khan, 2002; Amundsen & Ezbidi, 2002). However, the growth-oriented
policies during the period 1994-2000 did not yield results in the form of substantial
private sector job creation, and thereby expanding the tax base. Moreover, the PNA’s
policy of using public sector employment as a tool of incorporation and stabilisation
slowed down considerably by the end of the 1990s. Increasing criticisms of inefficient,
overstaffed government departments also contributed to slow the expansion of the
public sector.
The public sector was by far the largest employer in the areas controlled by the PNA.
By end 1999, about 19% of all employed persons in the WBGS (approximately
110,000 people) were on the PNA’s payroll (including education, health and security
forces).8 Of those employed in the local economy on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
by end 1999 (PEPRI/MAS, 2000):
                                           
6 This average excludes East Jerusalem with a population of more than 210 000 (in 1997). The figure
also hides substantial differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
7 See UNSCO (2001:29).
8 According to Nasr (2002), the public sector wage bill amounted to more than 12% of GDP in 1999.
C M I
5
· 33% were employed in services and other activities, including the public sector;
· 17.6% in commerce, hotels and restaurants;
· 16.7% in manufacturing and quarrying;
· 14.7% in agriculture;
· 12% in construction; and
· 6.3% in transportation, storage and communication.
Small, family-owned firms dominated the economy. According to UNSCO (1998),
76% of the firms in the WBG were sole ownerships, and almost 60% of the people
working in these companies were owners and unpaid family members. Furthermore, in
the industrial sector more than 90% of the companies had less than 10 employees
(PCBS, 1999).
In the 1970s and 1980s the proportion of the Palestinian labour force employed in the
Israeli economy exceeded 30% in the WB and even more in Gaza (Arnon & Weinblatt,
2001:298). After 1994, however, this proportion declined to only 14% (i.e., 75,000
people) in 1996. Thereafter, the number of Palestinian labourers working in Israel and
its settlements increased to 130,000 in 1999 (i.e., 22.8% of the employed labour force).
But because of the Israeli policy of closing the ‘borders’ a substantial share of the
annual working days was lost. Israel’s compulsive closure policy stopped in periods all
movement of people and goods between Israel and the Palestinian regions, as well as
between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. According to UNSCO
(2000), the number of ‘effective closure days’ (excluding weekends, Muslin and Jewish
holidays) were 64 in 1994, 84 in 1995, 90 in 1996, 57 in 1997, 14 in 1998, and 7 in
1999. In 2000, the days of closure reached 62 days (see www.paltrade.org). Moreover,
the closures opened the labour market in Israel to foreign labourers, notably from
Romania and Thailand (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001:299).
It is clear that that the WBGS’s economic performance was substantially hampered by
the ‘siege and closure’ policies of Israel since the establishment of the PNA. The policy
of closure was particularly damaging because it was often totally unpredictable
(Kanafani, 2001:289). Closures were declared for different lengths of time and were
imposed on various categories of workers, according to age, sex, marital status etc.
(Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001:298). All existing permits were suspended as long as a
closure was in effect. Consequently, political uncertainty was perceived to be the main
obstacle for investments. For instance, in a survey of the business environment in
WBGS, 77% of the respondents from the private business sector cited instability and
uncertainty as the major constraints for their operations and expansion (Sewell, 2001).
Moreover, in a survey of small and medium scale enterprises, 76.5% of the
respondents in the WB and 84% in the GS said that political instability was a major
problem for their businesses.9 Furthermore, three decades of Israeli occupation imposed
huge constraints on the development of the domestic market by neglecting
improvements of physical and administrative infrastructure, and restraining trade and
access to financial resources (Nasr, 1994).
                                           
9 The last survey was carried out in 2001 as part of our study and covered 34 firms in the WB (Ramallah
and Nablus) and 5o firms in Gaza.
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2.2 Fiscal policy and revenue clearance with Israel
The ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP was estimated to 23.4% in 1999, which compares
well with countries at a similar level of development (Fischer et al., 2001:272).10 Table
2.1 provides an overview of the composition of fiscal revenues in Palestine during the
period 1995-1999. The major tax bases were personal and corporate income taxes
(8.2% of total tax revenues in 1999), indirect taxes on domestic goods and services
(47.7%) and taxes on international transactions (30.3%). Furthermore, various types
of fees and charges were collected.11 While VAT and other indirect taxes on domestic
goods and services still accounted for almost half of total tax revenues, their share
dropped substantially during the late 1990s. In 1995, they accounted for about 66% of
total revenues. During the same period, revenues from customs duties and taxes on
imported goods increased from about 6% of total revenues in 1995 to approximately
30% in 1999. Income tax revenues remained fairly stable between 8-9% of total fiscal
revenues during the period 1996-99.
Table 2.1 Composition of major fiscal revenues in Palestine, 1995-2000 (in % of total
fiscal revenues)
Revenue sources 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Income taxes 11.6 8.3 8.6 9.0 8.2 8.3
Indirect taxes on domestic
goods and services
66.0 61.2 54.6 51.0 47.7 n.a.
Indirect taxes on
international transactions
6.2 16.0 20.0 26.7 30.3 n.a.
Property taxes 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.15 n.a.
Non-tax revenues (fees and
charges)
15.8 14.3 16.7 13.3 13.6 n.a.
Sources: Palestinian National Authority (2000) and World Bank (2001).
The PNA’s fiscal operations in the period 1994-2000 were to a large extent governed
by the principles of the Paris Protocol (PP), signed in 1994. This Protocol of Economic
Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, Representing
the Palestinian People limited the role of the PNA in designing its own fiscal and trade
regimes.12 In the area of tax administration, the PP provided a revenue clearance
system, according to which Israel collected and transferred to the PNA taxes and
                                           
10 The figure is, however, higher than the average for Arab countries. In 1995, tax revenue as a
percentage of GNP for Egypt was 26.3%, Yemen 13%, Morocco 23%, Syria 17.8%, Jordan 20.4%,
Tunisia 21%, Lebanon 10.8%. All these countries had lower GDP figures than the PNA due to their
dependence on migrant remittances (World Bank, 1997:258-259).
11 Annex 1 provides a detailed account of the Palestinian tax system during the period 1994-2000,
including the major central and local government tax bases and the revenue administration.
12 The title of the Protocol indicates that it was drawn up between two equal partners, in spite of the fact
that one contract partner was a state and the other an organisation (see Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001:295).
Kanafani (2001) provides an insightful discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the PP from both
Israeli and Palestinian perspectives.
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customs duties imposed on Palestinian imports from or via Israel, in addition to the
income taxes from wages of Palestinians working in Israel. However, with respect to
customs duties, the PNA could only reclaim import duties on goods that were directly
imported by Palestinian companies via Israel. Products that initially were imported by
Israeli companies and then re-exported to the Palestinian territories were, according to
the Israeli interpretation of the Paris Protocol, not eligible for re-claiming of customs
duty. Since a bulk of the imports to Palestine came via Israeli companies, 60%
according to some estimates, this arrangement with Israel led to a substantial loss in
customs revenues for the PNA (see section 4.4 for further details).
The share of fiscal revenues collected by Israel through the clearing system remained
fairly stable in the period 1995-99, and accounted for around 63% of the PNA’s fiscal
revenues in 1999 (Fischer et al., 2001:267). However, for individual revenue bases
some changes were observed during this period. For instance, in 1995 Israel collected
80.2% of indirect taxes on domestic goods and services, compared to 70.8% in 1999.
The opposite trend was observed for indirect taxes on international transactions where
Israel collected 72.1% in 1995, compared to 87.9% in 1999 (see Table 2.2).13
The figures above reflect the heavy dependence - and vulnerability - of the Palestinian
economy on Israel with respect to foreign trade, employment and tax revenues.
However, they also indicate that during the first years of operation, the unified invoice
system seemed to function fairly well, and probably better than most other
arrangements between the PNA and Israel. But it is clear that Israel’s narrow
interpretation of the clause of ‘place of final destination’ of imports led to substantial
revenue losses. As noted above, goods imported to the WBGS via the Israeli market
were not considered by Israel as being ‘proper imports’ and thus not eligible for reclaim
of customs duties by the PNA. This reflects the imperfection of the bilateral contract as
well as the asymmetry of power between Israel and the Palestinian authorities (see, for
instance, Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001).
Table 2.2 Fiscal revenues collected by Israel through the clearance system, 1995-
1999 (in % of total revenues from the specific revenue base)
Revenue sources 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Income taxes 10.1 7.2 9.1 13.5 8.4
Indirect taxes on domestic
goods and services
80.2 75.6 72.8 70.2 70.8
Indirect taxes on
international transactions
72.1 79.1 86.7 89.5 87.9
Non-tax revenues (fees and
charges)
25.4 12.4 14.3 15.6 15.2
Sources: Palestinian National Authority (2000) and World Bank (2001).
                                           
13 These figures include income taxes, indirect taxes on domestic goods and services (VAT and excises),
taxes on international transactions, and non-tax revenues. However, property taxes and local
government taxes and charges are excluded.
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2.3 Tax administration
In the areas controlled by the PNA, there were four central government agencies
authorised to collect taxes: (1) The Customs Department collected customs on goods
imported directly from Jordan and Egypt or through these countries; (2) The VAT and
Excise Taxes Department collected VAT and purchasing tax on domestic goods and
services; (3) The Income Tax Department collected personal income taxes through a
withholding system, as well as corporate profit taxes from registered companies based
on self-assessment albeit subject to negotiations with taxpayers in virtually all cases;
and (4) The Fiscal Department collected and managed the property taxes. There were
twelve offices for each of these departments in the main towns in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. The health, insurance, transportation fees, etc. were collected through
different offices on an annual basis.
With respect to local government taxes, the taxing power of local authorities was
limited. Fiscal decentralisation – including increased local tax autonomy – was
discussed during the late 1990s, but the implementation of this policy moved very
slowly. However, in January 2001, the responsibility for collecting property taxes was
transferred from the Ministry of Finance to local authorities on the WB (see appendix).
In addition, various forms of user charges were major revenue sources for local
authorities. But, generally, the uncertain political situation and the PNA’s well-founded
fear for increased fractionalisation of the country, contributed to sustain the highly
centralised taxing authority.
In the period 1995-2000, there were few and limited changes in the tax structure,
except from simplifications of the rate structures and reduction of some rates. The
most important changes were related to the granting of tax exemptions (see section 4.1
and 4.3). However, this is not surprising, since the Paris Protocol placed substantial
restrictions on how and what revisions could be made. Thus, due to the compelling
need to raise revenue quickly, the PNA focused on improving tax administration,
including the revenue clearance system with Israel, rather than revising the existing tax
structure. The increased domestic revenue generation during the period was, therefore,
mainly due to administrative measures such as the implementation of a tax arrears
settlement programme, improvements in enforcement provisions in the legislation, and
a campaign for tax registration. Additional measures to improve the tax administration
included the creation of a large taxpayer unit, a delinquent taxpayer unit, and the
establishment of a tax court.14 These measures enabled the PNA to establish a
potentially well functioning central government tax administration within a fairly short
period of time.
Despite the progress made to improving the tax administration there were substantial
weaknesses. Firstly, the tax base was eroded due to generous tax exemptions. In
particular larger companies, foreign investors, professionals and the agricultural sector
                                           
14 No tax disputes seem to have been solved by bringing them to court. Disputes have been solved either
by forwarding them to the Chairman of the PNA (President Arafat), or by negotiations and compromises
between the taxpayers and tax officials.
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were benefiting from exemptions. Secondly, current procedures facilitated tax evasion
and corruption, including:15
· lack of consistent audit and enforcement procedures and techniques;
· a practice of ‘negotiating’ income tax assessments;
· insufficient resources allocated to the large taxpayers unit; and
· inadequate training of staff.
According to the Director of the Income Tax Department (ITD) of the West Bank,
there were only 10 employees in this department in 2000. On average each of these
income tax officers handled some 65 files in the West Bank.16 Tax assessments by the
Palestinian Revenue Authority (PRA) found that in 90-95% of the cases incomes were
underreported. But, in spite of the existence of a tax court only 2-3 cases were filed to
the court per year. Most of the cases found a compromise through negotiations
between the taxpayer or his representative and the income tax official (see section 4.1).
                                           
15 Personal interview with an international public finance expert who resided at the Ministry of Finance
for a period while on an IMF mission (11 January 2001). The person preferred to be anonymous.
16 Only 650 private companies were registered and had files at the ITD in 2000. In addition, there were
some 30 partnerships registered with files in the department. Public companies did not file. Registration
procedures were based on the registration at the Ministry of Economy and Trade, which provided a
license number accompanied with the internal by-laws and contract of establishment. Procedures for tax
assessment were based on officially audited statements according to the companies and the tax code. The
Director of the ITD was not able to provide corresponding data from Gaza.
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3 Taxation and state-formation: Theoretical
perspectives
What factors explain the evolution of the Palestinian tax system since the mid-1990s?
In this section four analytical approaches are outlined, which may contribute to explain
observed changes and the major constraints that a government face in its efforts to
raise revenues from its citizens.
The structure of a country’s economy may be important in determining both the level
of taxation and the characteristics of the tax system (Tanzi, 2000). It is, for example,
administratively easier and cheaper to tax major industrial activities than peasant
agriculture. Thus, the economic structure ought to inform tax-policy making.
Moreover, the economic structure has also considerable effects on tax administration
and through this on state-society relations.17 Furthermore, structural changes in a
country’s economy are likely to change the constraints faced by government in its
search for revenue. Literature on tax structure change maintains that economic
development creates tax bases that can be exploited, and, thereby, raises the ‘taxable’
capacity of the country (Hinrichs, 1966; Musgrave, 1969). Thus, Tanzi (2000:224)
argues that the ‘increasing importance of taxes on personal income in many countries is
closely related with the increase in the share of wages and salaries in national income
as well as the expansion of incomes from interest, rent and dividends, as compared
with incomes of independent contractors including farmers’.
Politics, on the other side, determine the formulation and implementation of tax
politics (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Levi, 1988; and Steinmo, 1993).18 According to
Steinmo (1993), differences in tax systems and tax burdens between countries are due
to different political institutions, and not from differences in citizens’ attitudes to
service delivery or willingness to pay taxes.19 Domestic political institutions operate
within and must be understood in the context of the broader social, economic and
political setting in which they are embedded. Political institutions provide the context
in which individuals, groups and classes interpret their self-interests and thereby define
their policy preferences. Political institutions alter the distribution of power among
participants, and the structure of the decision-making institutions strongly affects how
interest groups, politicians and bureaucrats develop their policy preferences.
Following Steinmo (1993), individual interests concerning taxation are often confused
and split (wanting better public services and, at the same time, lower taxes). Sometimes
citizens also oppose outright what the government must do, for instance raising taxes
to achieve macroeconomic balance. If citizens’ opinions were unambiguous, the
mechanisms by which these opinions are translated into public policy should have little
                                           
17 In a study of tax shares (tax to GDP ratios) in sub-Saharan Africa, Stotsky & WoldeMariam (1997)
estimate a tax share for each country based on the structure of its economy. As expected, tax shares are
negatively related to agriculture’s proportion of the economy, and positively correlated with export share
and per capita income.
18 Therkildsen (2001) provides an excellent critical review of this literature.
19 Steinmo (1993) analyses the development of the tax systems in Britain, Sweden and the USA within a
historical institutional framework.
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independent effect on policy outcomes. But when public guidance is unclear or subject
to different interpretations, political institutions become important in shaping tax
policy decisions. Such institutions also shape the trade-off between the autonomy of the
ruling elite and its responsiveness to the public’s ambiguous tax/spending preferences.
Thus, Steinmo (1993) argues, it is institutions – rather than ideology – that are
significant in shaping the tax systems.
While Steinmo emphasises political institutions, Levi (1988) adds the perspective of
individual actors to her analysis of revenue generation and tax compliance.20 Levi
argues that it is important to maintain both an actor and an institutional perspective to
account for the effects of institutional change. She assumes that actors who compose
the polity are self-interested in the way that they calculate the costs and benefits of
proposed actions and chooses the course of action most consistent with their
preferences. Moreover, she assumes (p. 10) that rulers are predatory because they need
state revenues to pursue their personal objectives of staying in power.
Levi’s main proposition is that ‘rulers maximise revenue to the state but not as they
please’ due to the various constraints: transaction costs in tax enforcement, the
discount rate of rulers, and their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis agents and
constituents (p. 10). These constraints determine the choice of revenue system, since
rulers do not possess unlimited power, nor do constituents pay taxes voluntarily. Even
with extensive power and effective monitoring of taxpayers, a ruler cannot achieve full
compliance. Consequently, a ruler attempts to improve compliance at minimum costs,
while taxpayers try to avoid and evade taxes (Levi, 1988:49). A ‘balance’ between
these conflicting interests is achieved through bargaining between the ruler and various
groups making up the polity. This results in a ‘fiscal constitution’ for a polity
(Therkildsen, 2001:104).
Once a fiscal constitution’ is negotiated, the contract between the rulers and
constituents comes under pressure due to free-rider problems, imperfections in the
specification of the contract, and changes in the relative bargaining power between
rulers and constituencies. For instance, various interest groups may negotiate
favourable deals for themselves, or people may find ways to evade taxes. Moreover,
state functions may change in scope and character. Such factors will all influence
people’s perceptions of the costs and benefits of a given revenue system. Most
taxpayers are of course unable to assess the exact value of what they receive in return
from the government for taxes paid. However, it can be argued that the taxpayer has
general impressions and attitudes concerning his own and others’ terms of trade with
the government (Fjeldstad, 2001). If this is the case, then it is reasonable to assume that
a taxpayer's behaviour is affected by his satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with his
terms of trade with the government. Thus, if the system of taxes is perceived to be
unjust, tax resistance may, at least partly, be considered as an attempt by the taxpayer
to adjust his terms of trade with the government. Reciprocity is therefore crucial.
The three approaches summarised above hold intrinsic values for analyses of tax
policies in Palestine. The tax handle approach suggests that the structure of the
                                           
20 Levi, working within the tradition of rational choice institutionalism, is inspired by Machiavelli and
theories of collective action. She uses case-studies from republican Rome, medieval England and France,
Britain in the 18th century, and Australia in the 20th century.
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economy may be important in determining both the level and characteristics of the tax
system. The historical institutional perspective of Steinmo (1993) proposes that
changes in a country’s revenue system may be connected with major historical changes,
such as wars, or, as in the case of Palestine, the establishment of the PNA. Moreover,
the historical perspective provides an important reminder of the need to analyse the
evolutionary nature of the institutions setting tax policies, and that the preferences of
interest groups and individual actors are partly formed by institutions (Rakner,
2001:132). Levi’s perspective on the state (the ruler) as an institution with interests of
its own may contribute to the understanding of politics in Palestine, as politics is
characterised by strong executive powers (see Amundsen & Ezbidi, 2002).
Furthermore, her emphasis on policy formulation as a bargain between different
groups of actors may offer important insights into the study of institutional change in
Palestine, as it suggests that power relates both to politics (majority position) and
control of economic resources.
However, none of the analytical approaches discussed above have much to say about
the international context. In Palestine, the Israeli occupation undoubtedly affected
institutional development. Many of the institutional forms set up by Israel were
transferred to the PNA directly. Moreover, the Oslo Accord and the Paris Protocol
limited the PNA’s room for manoeuvring its own policies (see section 2). Furthermore,
foreign aid was an important revenue source for the PNA. Thus, an important question
is whether the external dependency on aid contributes to reduce domestic efforts for
revenue generation? Furthermore, does aid dependency undermine future sustainability
of the public sector if or when aid declines? And how does dependency affect
accountability relations between state and citizens?
Moore (1998) provides an innovative contribution to this debate by emphasising the
international context as a factor determining a government’s tax policy.21 According to
Moore, successful state formation in Europe came about through two main processes.22
Firstly, through inter-state military competition, and, secondly, through an intra-state
process of resource mobilisation for war that stimulated the creation of state-society
linkages, markets, bureaucracies, tax systems, etc.. In this process, states lost despotic
power (i.e., direct arbitrary control of subjects) but gained ‘infrastructural’ power (i.e.,
capacity to penetrate society, to extract resources from it and to co-operate with social
classes to achieve collective goals). Consequently, there is considerable historical
evidence to suggest that the emergence of a representative government and, more
loosely, of reciprocity and mutual accountability between states and citizens is more
likely when states face incentives to increase income through bargaining with citizens.
The process discussed above, however, did not take root everywhere. It was most
pronounced where capital was mobile, i.e., in the form of financial and trading assets.
Here the mutual advantages of co-operation between rulers and citizens were greatest
(see Therkildsen, 2001:114). Co-operation protected owners of capital from arbitrary
and exploitative tax enforcement. It also gave owners of capital direct and legitimate
                                           
21 This discussion builds on the review by Therkildsen (2001).
22 Moore builds here on Tilly (1992) who explores the evolution of European states. Tilly’s main
argument is that in Europe over the past two centuries taxation and disputes over the use of revenues
stimulated the development of greater citizen rights and privileges, with democratic institutions enforcing
accountability and greater transparency in expenditures.
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influence over the military and diplomatic policies and operations. This was useful
when competing with other trading nations. Rulers on the other hand could gain
greater tax compliance from co-operation by retaining owners of mobile capital within
their jurisdiction and by attracting capitalists from other states. But, such processes are
not likely to operate when the state is fiscally independent of its population because its
revenues are obtained from owners of fixed property, or from a few specific internal
natural sources (e.g., oil and minerals), or from foreign aid.
Thus, Moore’s key proposition is that the more a state ‘earns’ its income through the
operation of a bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection, the more it needs to enter into
reciprocal arrangements with citizens about provision of services and representation in
exchange for tax contributions.23 In other words, the greater the share of ‘earned’
incomes represents of total revenues, the more likely it is that state-society relations
will be characterised by accountability, responsiveness and democracy. But, aid
dependency may thwart these processes. A relevant question is therefore whether
foreign aid, so substantial in relation to other income sources, made the PNA relatively
dependent on external political and material support, and relatively independent of its
own citizens on the WBGS?
                                           
23 Moore (1998: 94) argues that the use of the concept ‘earned’ is a logical extension from the term
‘rentier’, since rentier is ‘unearned’ in the language of classical political economy.
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4 The politics of tax policy in Palestine
The questions of concern in this section are: How is the socio-economic structure
reflected in the politics and administration of taxation during the period 1994-2000?
To what extent are the interests of particular groups reflected in the tax system? Had
any interest group any significant impact on the tax system? To what degree did the
nature and capacity of the administrative and political institutions in Palestine
represent a constraint for the PNA to implementing tax policy? Moreover, to what
extent was the influence of Israel reflected in the present tax system? And what impacts
on tax policy had foreign aid since the establishment of the PNA? The theoretical
frameworks discussed above may all offer some insights into these questions, and,
together, they suggest that the PNA faced four major constraints in terms of revenue
mobilisation.24 These constraints are:
· The socio-economic structure;
· The nature and capacity of administrative and political institutions;
· The bargaining powers of interest groups; and
· The influence of external actors, i.e., the international context.
In the remaining part of this section, these four factors are discussed as potential
constraints on the efforts of the PNA to raise revenues, and, thus, to explaining the
observed tax polices and related rent-seeking activities.
4.1 The socio-economic structure
It can be argued that if a sector of the society controls major economic interests, the
bargaining position of the government is challenged (Levi, 1988). Likewise, but
inverting the argument, Moore (1998) questions the willingness of a government to
abide by democratic rules if the same government controls major economic resources
through state ownership and rents (see Rakner, 2001:137). In Palestine during the
period 1994-2002, the economy was dominated by small, family-owned farms and
enterprises, and peasant agriculture (see section 2.1 above). However, many of the
larger private firms, including some monopolies, were owned – or managed – by high-
ranking public officials (PLC, 1997; CPRS, 1998). Moreover, some of the larger
companies were owned – fully or partially – by the PNA. These included, for instance,
the Petroleum Public Commission, the Tobacco Commission, the Radio and Television
Commission, and the Palestinian National Company for Economic Development (see
Nasr, 2002).
To what extent is this ownership structure, i.e., control over resources, reflected in
economic policy and the tax system? Following the Oslo Accord between the PLO and
Israel, the PNA’s principal challenges were to promote economic development and
alleviate poverty. But, the PNA faced major constraints in pursuing these objectives:
lack of control over borders, limited control over land, water and other natural
resources, poor physical infrastructure, weak institutions, limited financial and human
capital, and a high degree of political and economic uncertainty. In this setting, the
                                           
24 This framework follows the analytical approach suggested by Rakner (2001).
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PNA was faced with a choice between either a policy of drastic redistribution that
might have resulted in the better-off pulling out and an uninviting climate for new
foreign investments, or, alternatively, a policy of encouraging foreign and domestic
investments and private enterprise at the expense of continued socio-economic
inequality. The PNA chose the second line, assuming that market-oriented policies
would further economic growth.
The PNA repeatedly called upon foreign investors and in particular the Palestinian
Diaspora to invest in Palestine. Responding on this call, one group of Palestinian
investors established the ‘Palestinian Development and Investment Corporation Ltd.’
(PADICO). This company established a number of subsidiaries in various sectors,
including telecommunications, real estate, industrial estate, tourism, electronics,
poultry, etc. (see Nasr, 2002). Another group of investors founded the ‘Arab
Palestinian Investment Corporation Ltd.’ (APIC), which set up subsidiaries within
medical services, car rental, cold storage, shopping centres, etc.. Furthermore, both
foreign and local investors invested in the banking sector, which expanded from two
banks in 1993 to 22 banks (and 120 branches) in 2000. Of these banks, 13 were
owned wholly or partially by the Diaspora (PEPRI/MAS, 1997). In addition, some
smaller foreign investors invested in real estate and the service sectors, which were
perceived to be less risky than other sectors. Long-term investments in job-creating
sectors, however, were limited due to the political instability.
The important role played by the international community in setting up the peace
agreement with Israel and the financial assistance from donor countries, made the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) very influential in pushing for
an export oriented, private sector-led market economy (PNA, 1996). Thus, since 1994
the PNA implemented an economic policy that benefited large corporate interests and
the manufacturing industry, which had close linkages to - and was partly owned by -
the political and administrative elite. Moreover, the policy benefited foreign investors.
To some extent small-scale agriculture also benefited. Since most agricultural activities
were located in either the B-designated areas where security was joint between the PNA
and Israel or in the C-designated areas where security was totally under the Israeli
control, both the PNA and foreign donors were reluctant to give aid to agricultural
activities due to the uncertain political situation. The sector was partly compensated by
various economic concessions, including tax exemptions. In the West Bank, but not in
Gaza, all agricultural incomes were exempted from income tax. The differences
between the West Bank and Gaza in this respect are partly historical. Under the
Jordanian tax codes that were in force in the WB during the period of 1951-1967 and
onwards until the establishment of the PNA, farmers and the agricultural sector were
exempted from income taxes. In GS, however, the tax codes were influenced by the
Egyptian codes, which did not exempt farmers from taxation. The PNA did not show
willingness to substantially change these codes under the pretext that agricultural
income in the WB was more subject to weather fluctuations since it depended heavily
on olive production. But, the fact that farmers, peasants and village dwellers in general
played an important role in the national movement in the WB, most likely also had
impacts on the tax policy toward these groups.
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4.2 Institutional constraints on revenue mobilisation
As emphasised by Rakner (2001), one obvious weakness of much of the current
theoretical literature on revenue mobilisation is the implicit assumption that, once
decided on, policies are implemented. Particularly in a developing country context, a
major obstacle is the government’s own capacity to carry out policies (Therkildsen,
2000). The institutional constraints on policy change were substantial in Palestine after
Oslo. The extreme political uncertainty added to these institutional constraints. Thus,
factors beyond the control of the PNA had significant impacts on both policy
formulation and implementation. Much of the PNA’s fiscal operations were governed
by the Paris Protocol, which only gave the PNA a limited role in designing its own
fiscal and trade regimes. Thus, with respect to tax policy, the best the PNA could do
was to strengthen the domestic tax administration and to establish the revenue
clearance system with Israel.
The PNA used public office holding as a reward for political and personal loyalty, and
as a mechanism of stabilising the regime (see section 2.1). Particularly, the expansion of
the security forces can be seen in the context of the PNA trying to strengthen its control
over the population. However, a tax system is also potentially an instrument for
political control based on information about citizens, and on a network of tax
collectors (Moore, 1998). With little bureaucratic presence and limited information
about what goes on at the grassroot level, a government leaves itself vulnerable to
organised predators, such as private armies and religious fundamentalists. In such
situations states may also rely more on patrimonial and personal linkages in running
the government. These observations may contribute to explain why the PNA put so
much effort into establishing the new tax administrations. It may also explain why
several revenue administrations were set up, thereby not risking that one, strong central
revenue authority would be in complete control of taxation.
It should, however, be acknowledged that setting up a large centralised revenue
administration may take more effort and require higher institutional capacity than
setting up several smaller ones, though the latter may have positive long-run effects on
tax capacity. Moreover, the set-up of the tax administrations in the WBGS was heavily
influenced by the IMF and the World Bank. For instance, several IMF-missions in the
mid- and late 1990s resided with the Ministry of Finance offering technical assistance
and policy advice on taxation and administration. In particular, the International
Finance Institutions focused on building institutional capacity within the PNA
emphasising ‘transparency’ in government operations. 25   
The administrative structure that was established with several tax administrations put,
however, severe burdens on senior officials within the Ministry of Finance. For
instance, they had to intervene to settle disputes on tax assessment especially when
influential taxpayers were involved: ‘Give a discount or a tax exempt’ was the
approach to solve problems. The integrity of the tax officers was under heavy pressure
due to social obligations and political interventions, which reduced the arm’s length
relations between taxpayers and enforcers.
                                           
25 In April 2000, however, the PNA consolidated all tax revenue under the Ministry of Finance.
According to Fischer et al. (2001:271), the PNA took this step to ‘…make its own financial operations
more transparent…’.
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Furthermore, low wages in the public sector in general and in the tax administration in
particular, left no option but to accept the employment of second or third rated
graduates with limited skills in accounting. The best graduates usually were recruited
to more attractive jobs in private accounting companies. Moreover, some of those who
were recruited to the tax administration exploited their positions to supplement their
own meagre salaries by extracting rents through the informal system of settling
accounts. For instance, in a survey of small and medium sized firms, 41% of the
respondents in the WB said that their own tax assessment differed from that of the
revenue authority (PRA).26 Businesspeople interviewed gave various reasons to
explaining the differences in tax assessment, including ‘the PRA officials do not trust
the books’, and ‘some expenses are not recognised by the tax officers’. 35% of the
respondents in the WB said the differences were solved through negotiation with the
tax officers. Dishonest tax collectors were perceived to be a problem by 38% of the
respondents in the WB and by 30% in Gaza.27 According to an official interviewed in
the Income Tax Department (ITD) in Ramallah, very few corrupt tax collectors were
detected. However, those few who were caught were asked to resign to maintain their
dignity instead of being brought to court.
4.3 Interest groups and the role of civil society
Within pluralist systems of rule, voluntary associations operating independently of
state structures can be expected to play a major role in shaping and implementing tax
policies. Thus, we would expect that the introduction of competitive electoral policies
would bring new stakeholders into the debates over the politics of taxation. The
establishment of the PNA does not support this expectation.
The PNA inaugurated a liberal ‘constitution’. The general election in 1996, which was
largely conducted in a free and democratic way, gave this emerging state system the
necessary legitimacy (see Hilal & Khan, 2002). However, the executive controlled the
security apparatus. Moreover, most of the members of the ‘Palestinian leadership’ (i.e.,
the Speaker of the PLC, the Speaker of the PNC, heads of the main security forces,
ministers, executive committee members, etc.) owed their position to Arafat personally
(Amundsen & Ezbidi, 2002). Furthermore, the political ‘leadership’ did not have
representatives from the private business community or the opposition or civil
organisations. These features led to a situation where the PNA managed to centralise
power.
Linked to the increasing consolidation of political power within the PNA, no
meaningful opposition was established as a political factor until the second Intifada.
The 1996 election campaign produced a variety of political programmes by the
different political organisations campaigning. But neither Fateh nor the opposition
made any reference to taxation. Thus, it cannot be argued that the PNA faced any
major challenges from its political opponents with respect to revenue policies.
                                           
26 The survey was carried out in 2001 as part of this study (see section 2.1).
27 Some respondents mentioned that certain tax collectors gave them a ‘secret account number’ where
deposits could be made to settle a tax assessment differential. Others said that they had to pay in the
form of a gift (usually electrical devices).
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The increasing influence of the executive power in Palestine during the period 1994-
2000 is partly explained by the weakness of interest groups. Opposition parties more
or less accepted to work within the ceilings of the new regime (Hilal & Khan, 2002).
Other civil society formations, such as professional associations and trade unions lost
much of their social base and mobilising capabilities in the early 1990s after the
erosion of the popular character of the first Intifada. The PLO factions created the
main body of these civil society formations with an overarching aim of organising
opposition to the Israeli occupation and of providing some services to poorer segments
of the population. Thus, they posed no serious problem to the regime.28
A number of civic associations transformed themselves into professional NGOs – in the
form of human rights advocacy, ‘developmental’ and service-oriented organisations.
But the NGOs autonomy remained questionable, partly because of their dependency on
short-term external donor funding, and partly because they had no real organised
power base and therefore little real bargaining power with the ‘government’. They had
therefore very limited influence on economic policies. According to Hilal & Khan
(2002), most NGOs retained an interest in colluding with the PNA, as it was in their
interest not to ‘irritate’ it. One outcome of this ‘collusion’ was that NGOs were
exempted from taxation, including VAT and taxes on imported goods and services.
Few of the economic interest groups in Palestine had the capacity, in respect of
membership density, finances and organisational resources, to engage in an active
dialogue with the regime on issues of taxation and, more generally, economic
development. Fateh dominated most of the professional associations, including those of
lawyers, doctors and engineers (see Hilal & Khan, 2002). These associations were
better organised than popular organisations, and had, unlike NGOs, a well-defined and
stable constituency. The relationship between professionals and Fateh may, thus, have
hidden important channels of rent-seeking and channels of influence of government
policies. Hence, many professionals stayed outside the tax net. For instance, the Income
Tax Department (ITD) was tolerant towards them on the ground that ‘it was enough
that they paid the VAT’.29 This was due even though the tax authorities assumed that
many professionals underreported their sales to evade taxes, and it was very difficult to
check their true turnover. Thus, the lion’s share of personal income tax revenues was
generated from wage employees where taxes were withheld at source.30
In contrast to local capital that was dominated by small-scale family capital, expatriate
capital was represented by larger businesses. Following the Oslo agreement, a number
of large expatriate businesspeople offered ‘partnership’ with the PLO to developing
Palestine economically. But according to Hilal & Khan (2002), Arafat was careful not
to give political weight to expatriate capital. Instead he viewed these partnerships as a
                                           
28 In 2000, several business associations joined forces with the aim of voicing their interests. In December
2000, an overarching co-ordinating body was established. This body included the main sectors of the
indigenous capital, including the Federation of Chambers and Commerce, the Federation of Chambers of
Industry, Paltrade, and Palestine Information Technology Association.
29 Personal communications with staff at the ITD (June 21, 2001, Ramallah).
30 To further illustrate this point, there were only 650 files of registered companies in the West Bank, and
no company was registered in Gaza Strip. This implies that on average a company in the West Bank paid
less than USD 18,000 in corporate taxes on an annual basis (see annex 1). This supports the argument
that the Palestinian income tax during the period 1994-2000 was mainly imposed on individual wage
earners and, to some extent, on smaller firms with limited opportunities for evading.
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way of enhancing the rent-seeking activities of the PNA, e.g., by providing
discretionary funds, and to some extent also as a tool for job creation. In return, the
PNA granted expatriate capital monopoly status (see Nasr, 2002) and tax exemptions
(see section 4.1 above and details in annex 1).
The PNA established ‘investor-friendly taxes’ with relatively low corporate taxes and
absence of capital-gains taxes. The ‘Investment Promotion Law’, which was passed in
1995 and modified in 1998, aimed to provide incentives to local and foreign private
entrepreneurs (Ministry of Economy and Trade, 1998:18-19).31 In 1997 and 1998, 144
projects applied for tax exemptions (74 in 1997 and 70 in 1998).32 The Palestinian
Investment Promotion Agency (PIPA) approved 125 projects. Of these only 52 projects
were implemented in 1997 and 1998, representing a total investment of USD 97.5
million (i.e. 28.4% of the projected investment). The remaining either existed before
the Law or were not implemented. In 1998, 22 ‘existing’ projects benefited from the
tax exemptions (almost one third of those approved in 1998) with a total value of
more than USD 20 million.
Almost two third of the projects that were granted tax exemptions were classified as
‘industrial’ while the rest were in the service sector, including tourism and health.
However, many projects classified as ‘industrial’, were actually hotels and private
medical services. Moreover, most of these projects were large projects of which the
capital investment exceeded one million USD. Due to fairly generous exemptions and
tax holidays benefiting larger companies, some critics argued that the law was biased
towards large firms, thus promoting monopolies and rents to politically influential
groups. Moreover, it was argued that the ‘Investment Promotion Law’ ignored small-
scale businesses that represented the majority of Palestinian enterprises.
This argument is also supported by survey-data. According to Sewell (2001),
perceptions of the tax system and regulations differed between firms according to firm
size. Almost 65% of the small firms (with fewer than 10 full-time employees) and 57%
of the medium-size firms (with 10 to 50 full-time employees) in the sample considered
taxes and regulations to be major or moderate constraints to business. In contrast, less
than 35% of the larger firms gave this answer. With respect to taxation, 74% of small-
size firms, 61% of medium-size firms and only 26% of large firms considered high
taxes to be a moderate or major constraint to their businesses. Moreover, in contrast to
smaller and medium sized firms, a majority of large firms (58%) said that they or their
trade associations were frequently, mostly or always consulted about changes in
regulation or policies.
The tax concessions given to larger investors, however, reflect the substantial
bargaining power of owners of mobile capital vis-à-vis the PNA, in contrast to the
bargaining powers of small-scale businesses whose major capital was in the form of
                                           
31 The General Department of Investment at the Ministry of Economy and Trade provided internal
reports (in Arabic) on investment projects that benefited from the law. The information in this
paragraph is based on the reports for 1997 (before the law was passed by the PLC) and 1998.
32 These projects represented total investments of USD 343 million. Fully domestically owned projects,
represented about 57% of this capital, while pure foreign owned investments represented less than 5%
of the capital. Joint-ventures between foreign and domestic investors, contributed with the remaining
38%.
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fixed property (see Moore, 1998; and Tilly, 1992). But, given the extreme political
instability in the Palestinian territories, and the fact that the PNA during this period
was a ‘government’ that lacked many of the formal powers of a national government,
these achievements of attracting large-scale investors were not trivial. Here the mutual
co-operation between rulers and capitalists was highest. Thus, these activities indicate
that the PNA managed to take a longer-term perspective for developing Palestine. Yet,
the PNA faced substantial institutional constraints in terms of both extracting more
revenues from the business sector and widening its tax base.
To summarise this discussion, neither the electoral processes nor organised interest
groups exerted major pressures on the regime to review its tax policy. However, the
educated middle class (professionals) and expatriate capitalists had close, informal ties
with Fateh – the ruling party. Thus, to get things done, consultations were done on an
ad hoc (one-to-one) basis. Moreover, widespread tax exemptions seem to be founded
on the regime’s concern for political support. Taxation is in general unpopular. Thus, a
policy to widen the existing fairly narrow tax base to include sectors that were not
paying taxes would most likely be a politically risky affair leading to increased
unpopularity. Furthermore, it might also have led to a more active and co-ordinated
business community that would develop into a politically strong interest group.
4.4 The influence of Israel and foreign donors on tax policies
The Paris ‘Protocol of Economic Relations’ limited the role of the PNA in designing its
own fiscal and trade regimes (see section 2.2). Israel collected a major share of the
PNA’s tax revenues through the revenue clearance system, reflecting the heavy
dependence of the Palestinian economy on Israel with respect to foreign trade,
employment and tax revenues (see Table 4.1).
Some of the arrangements within the Paris Protocol were, however, highly
unfavourable for the PNA.33 For instance, the PNA could only reclaim import duties on
goods that were directly imported by Palestinian companies via Israel. Products that
initially were imported by Israeli companies and then re-exported to the Palestinian
territories were, according to the Israeli interpretation of the Paris Protocol, not eligible
for re-claiming of customs duty. Since the bulk of the imports to Palestine came via
Israeli companies, this arrangement led to substantial losses in customs revenues for the
PNA. Furthermore, many Palestinian merchants disguised the true final destination of
their imported goods in order to avoid delays and complications by the Israeli customs,
with the consequence that the PNA lost revenues from import duties. Another
significant source of fiscal leakage was Israel’s refusal to refund to the PNA the
purchase taxes, excises and surcharges that were imposed on some locally produced
Israeli products which were exported to the WBGS and consumed by the Palestinians.
On cigarettes alone, approximately USD 25 million were lost.
There have been several attempts to estimate these lost revenues (Kanafani, 2001:286).
According to Sahban & Jawhary (1995:xxxiii), the foregone revenue on indirect
imports as a percentage of GDP was about 6% -7%. The PNA estimated the ‘fiscal
leakage’ to USD 380 million annually (PNA, 1998).34 Dumas (1999), however, concluded
                                           
33 See Kanafani (2001:285-288) for details.
34 In comparison, the total donor funding to the WBGS in 1998 were USD 553 million (see Table 4.1).
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that the lost revenues amounted to USD 90-140 million in 1997, equivalent to 2.6-4.2% of the
GDP of the WBGS. According to estimates made by the IMF resident mission in the
WBGS, the annual loss in revenues through these unequal arrangements corresponded
to 77% of the amount actually refunded in 1997.
Table 4.1 Revenue clearance with Israel and foreign aid, 1994-1999 (in million USD).
Figures in brackets are in percentage of GNI
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1994-9
Revenue clearance 25
(0.06)
266
(6.4)
420
(10.3)
496
(11.1)
542
(11.4)
626
(12.2)
2,375
(9.0)
Total foreign aid
disbursements
612
(15.4)
547
(13.2)
647
(15.8)
654
(14.7)
553
(11.6)
609
(11.9)
3,622
(13.8)
Sources: Fischer et al., (2001:256, Table 1) and Arnon & Weinblatt (2001:299, Table 4).
It is clear that the way certain aspects of the Paris Protocol were designed and
implemented led to continuous conflicts of interest between the contracting parties. It
also raises the question of why Palestinian negotiators initially accepted such terms. It
seems, however, clear that the Palestinian negotiators tried to acquire as many
attributes of sovereignty as possible, while the Israelis wanted to postpone as many
decisions as possible to the negotiations over the final status of the Palestinian
territories (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001:296). The Palestinians aspired to set their own
priorities, without Israeli interference, including the formation of a new Palestinian
trade policy. The Israeli negotiators, however, proposed to continue the existing de
facto (partial) customs union, which did not require the creation of trade borders
between the two economies. They succeeded to convince the Palestinians that a more
protectionist policy would reduce the Palestinians’ chances of building a prosperous
economy. Clearly the Paris Protocol reflects the uneven balance of power between the
two parties and the transitional nature of the agreements. While Israel was a well-
established state with a large modern army, the PNA had limited autonomy and was
making its first steps towards national sovereignty. As a result, the power sharing of
the Paris Protocol itself gave significantly more power to Israel than to the PNA (Arnon
& Weinblatt, 2001:301).
The dependency on Israel left the PNA extremely vulnerable and gave Israel a political
weapon to exert pressure on the PNA. On several occasions during the 1997-2000
period, Israel withheld tax revenues collected (Nasr, 2002). This measure was prima
facie a violation of the Paris Protocol, reflecting the imperfection of the bilateral
contract whereby one side could violate the agreement without bearing noteworthy
consequences (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001:302). To reduce its vulnerability, the PNA,
therefore, undertook various types of off-budget fiscal activities and established ‘secret’
accounts. Little information exists on the sources and scope of these off-budget
accounts, and how these funds were used.35 Thus, in recent years, there have been
repeated accusations of non-transparency and manipulations of the secret accounts
                                           
35 According to Fischer et al. (2001:258), a large part of this money went to finance investments in
commercial operations through the Palestinian Commercial Services Company (PCSC). But it is still not
known how much has been used on current expenditures.
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controlled by the PNA. However, given the unstable political situation and the fact that
Israel on several occasions stopped transferring tax revenues collected to the PNA, it
seems both legitimate and rational that the PNA operated with such accounts as a
buffer to meet urgent needs and commitments.
To what extent did the inflow of foreign aid to Palestine provide a disincentive for the
PNA in terms of tax-collection effort? During the period 1994-2000, the PNA had
significant, although declining, ‘unearned’ incomes in the form of foreign aid (Table
4.1). In view of their active involvement in the Middle East peace process, we may thus
expect that international aid organisations would have a substantial influence in
shaping the economic policies – including the tax policies - of the PNA. Moore’s (1998)
approach may offer important insights into the question whether pressures for
accountability and transparency came from internal or external actors (see section 3).36
Annual disbursements to the PNA – in the forms of loans and grants – averaged USD
600 million per year in the period 1994-99, corresponding to almost 14% of Gross
National Income (GNI) per annum over the six years (see Table 4.1). Almost 90% of
the aid in this period was provided in the form of grants. Moreover, more than half of
the aid was for current spending, including job creation and technical assistance, and
the rest was devoted to investments projects (Fischer et al., 2001:258). In 1999 foreign
aid funded all Palestinian public investments, of about 5% of GDP (including
investments undertaken by UNRWA). Still, the ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP was
about 23% in 1999, compared to an aid to GDP ratio of around 10%. However, when
excluding the revenues collected by Israel through the clearing system, the ‘domestic’
fiscal revenue to GDP ratio was approximately 9%. Furthermore, foreign aid
amounted to almost USD 175 per capita, making the West Bank and Gaza one of the
largest recipients of aid in the world on a per capita basis, together with Bosnia
Herzegovina and Israel where non-military foreign assistance represented
approximately USD 200 and USD 247 per capita, respectively (DAC, 1997). This level
of assistance reflects the great importance that donors placed on supporting the Middle
East peace process. Donor support for current expenditures declined, however, during
the period in question. Overall, foreign aid in percent of GDP fell from 18% in 1994 to
around 10% in 1999.
Based on the available data, it is, however, not possible to provide a clear answer to the
question raised above on the possible impacts of foreign aid on domestic revenue
generation. With respect to taxation, the scope for influencing the tax policy was also
limited. Firstly, the PNA inherited a fairly developed tax system, including VAT,
because of the Israeli occupation in 1967. Secondly, after 1994 the tax system,
especially indirect taxes, was to a large extent regulated by the principles of the Paris
Protocol.
But, there can be no doubt that donor assistance had a substantial effect on the
Palestinian domestic economy in the period 1994 to 2000. Most immediately, the
inflow of foreign aid stimulated local economic activity and contributed to household
incomes. Moreover, until the Israeli demolition of the administrative and physical
                                           
36 Brautigam & Botchwey (1999) argue that many ‘aid dependent’ governments seem currently to face
more organised and effective pressures for accountability and transparency from the international
community and donor agencies than from their own citizens and parliaments.
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infrastructure on the West Bank in April 2002, aid also enhanced the productive
potential of the economy by supporting investments that expanded the underlying
economic productive capacity.
World Bank (2000:26-27) estimated that the production capacity of the Palestinian
economy was 6-7% higher than it would have been without donor-financed
investments. Thus, foreign aid contributed to offset parts of the cumulative negative
effects of the Israeli policy of border closure and other restrictions against the
Palestinian people. In particular, the initially high degree of budget support provided
by donors helped the PNA to establish operations and avoid potentially destabilising
fiscal deficits at a critical stage. However, recurrent budget support also facilitated an
expansion of public sector employment that, in spite of immediate political support, led
to overstaffing and probably undermined the administrative efficiency of the PNA.
On several occasions the donors criticised the PNA for lack of transparency in its
financial operations, including the off-budget fiscal activities and weak technical
decisions in its handling of public finances. But, the donors’ focus was on keeping the
peace process alive. Thus, generally, foreign donors’ seemed to turn a blind eye to
issues such as transparency and accountability in the PNA’s fiscal affairs. Given the
political instability and the contagious effects of the escalating violence in the area, this
position may seem to have been justified. However, by making the PNA relatively
dependent on external political and material support, and relatively independent of its
own citizens on the WBGS, this approach may in a longer-term perspective have
contributed to undermine the development of state-society relationships based on
responsiveness and accountability. In this perspective, it may take long time to re-
establish the credibility and trustworthiness of the PNA vis-à-vis its citizens.
To summarise the discussion in this section: The socio-economic structure, the nature
of government institutions, the bargaining powers of interest groups, and international
actors were treated as potential constraining factors on the efforts of the PNA to raise
revenues, and, thus, to explaining the observed tax policies. First, and not very
surprisingly, the socio-economic structure mattered. In particular, the fact that a large
share of the population lived under the poverty line limited the tax base. Moreover,
small-scale farming and small, family owned enterprises dominated the economy. The
taxable capacity of these sectors is often limited and the administrative costs of
enforcing taxes from these sectors are high. This partly explains why the most
productive tax handles from a revenue perspective, were income taxes on public sector
employees and taxes on international trade. Second, the administrative and political
institutions in Palestine during the period in question were to a large extent controlled
by the executive, and, thus, did not represent constraining factors on the government’s
tax policy. However, in a developing country context it must be acknowledged that the
government’s own capacity to carry out policies is a major obstacle for implementing
policies. The gap between implementation and policies is often huge, and institutional
change often a slow and incremental process. Third, various interest groups,
particularly foreign based capital owners (the Palestinian Diaspora) and to some extent
professionals constrained the PNA’s revenue mobilisation efforts. The tax exemptions
given to larger investors, reflect the substantial bargaining power of owners of mobile
capital vis-à-vis the PNA, in contrast to the bargaining powers of small-scale
enterprises whose major capital was in the form of fixed property. Finally, the
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international context was a factor that substantially influenced the revenue-collection
efforts. More than any other stakeholders, Israel represented a constraint on the PNA’s
tax policies and revenue collection. Moreover, the dependency on external assistance
both for investments and to cover running expenses may have had impacts on the
PNA’s incentives to enter into reciprocal and accountable arrangements with citizens
about provision of services and representation in return for tax contributions.
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5 Concluding remarks
The state formation process in Palestine during the period 1994-2000, in contrast to
the European experience, was not related to inter-state war but to insurgency against,
or negotiation with, Israeli occupation. This conflict did not contribute to increased tax
extracting capacity of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as wars did in the
West. Although the conflict changed the relations between the new rulers and the
ruled, relations of accountability between the PNA and citizens remained weak –
perhaps because the government depended only partly on their citizens to mobilise
revenues. The authority relied more on foreign aid and taxes on international trade.
Israel partly controlled and clearly dominated tax policies in the WBGS. The
integration between the Palestinian and Israeli goods, labour and capital markets
imposed severe constraints on the ability of the PNA to choose its own tax policy
direction. Israel collected the bulk of taxes on traded goods on behalf of the PNA, and
until the second Intifada a large share of income taxes came from Palestinians working
in Israel. By withholding revenues collected on behalf of the PNA, Israel was able to
exert substantial financial pressure on the PNA. This measure was a direct violation of
the Paris Protocol of Economic Relations, reflecting the imperfections of the bilateral
contract and the uneven balance of power between the two parties. Thus, Kanafani
(2001:282) argues that the weaker Palestinian party was left with ‘a chronic sense of
being ill-treated and of being impotent, while the other party was bound to fall into the
trap of the arrogance of power’. Another problem of the Paris Protocol was its failure
to take adequately into account the Palestinians’ aspirations for sovereignty (see Arnon
& Weinblatt, 2001). Instead it maintained the heavy dependence of the Palestinian
economy on Israel and its economic policies.
However, within its room of manoeuvre, the PNA maximised domestic revenues
subject to the constraint of consolidating and maintaining power. In particular, the
PNA was constrained by the bargaining powers of interest groups and international
factors in its efforts to mobilise tax revenues. Thus, the PNA used the tax system as a
means of enhancing rents from industries and sectors into which the leadership had
economic interests, and, furthermore, to grant generous tax exemptions to potentially
important stakeholders such as professionals and large expatriate capital. In contrast,
few tax concessions were given to employees in the formal sector. Thus, the business
interests of the minority of expatriate capitalists were more influential than trade
unions and the emerging domestically based business associations.
During the first four years after its inauguration, the PNA was able to maintain the
dualism of macroeconomic orthodoxy and provide generous tax incentives for
important groups in the society, combined with fairly progressive social policies due to
the revenue windfall from foreign aid and the monopolies. The PNA made also real
progress, with generous external assistance, in establishing a functioning economic
administration and in developing the physical and institutional infrastructure of the
economy. This secured widespread internal legitimacy among the Palestinian
population, which also was reflected in the 1996-election, and helped the PNA to
centralise power.
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But, a major problem for the PNA was that it did not manage to create confidence in
its ability and capacity to deliver promised returns for taxes paid and foreign aid
received. The deteriorating security situation in the late 1990s and declining social
welfare raised citizens’ perceptions of exploitation from an unequal contract with the
government and promoted resistance. In this perspective, the PNA’s trustworthiness
was closely linked to citizens’ perceptions of the capacity of the PNA to make credible
commitments about the use of tax revenues and foreign aid, as well as its procedures
for designing and implementing fiscal policy non-arbitrarily. Moreover, extensive and
increasing corruption contributed to undermine popular confidence in the PNA as a
trustworthy force in the struggle against the Israeli occupation. The al-Aqsa intifada
further eroded the domestic financial sources of the PNA, both in the form of general
tax revenues and incomes from the monopolies. Since Israel in October 2000 stopped
transferring revenues collected on behalf of the PNA, the central state organs in
Palestine became cash strapped. This led to long delays in payment of salaries to
ministerial staff. Moreover, limited means were available for the funding of public
services by the PNA, and maintenance of infrastructure came to a standstill.
Foreign aid did not manage to compensate for this revenue shortfall. Increasingly aid
was bypassing the central government and went directly to local institutions and non-
governmental and religious organisations. In particular, this was the case for aid and
financial support originating from other Arab nations. This, coupled with escalating
poverty and unemployment, and growing frustration among Palestinians for lack of
progress in the relationship with Israel, have led to increasing support to opposition
parties and the Islamists.
Until the second Intifada, no meaningful opposition to PLO had established itself as a
political factor. However, since September 2000 Hamas has won increasing support
among broader segments of the population. The Islamist movement’s new strength and
popularity is partly due to the social work that Hamas charities are carrying out. The
Israeli policy of destabilising the PNA by withholding revenues has also contributed to
strengthen the Islamists as an alternative to the PNA with respect to social welfare and
service delivery, as well as a credible force in the struggle against the occupation. In
Gaza, with more than 35% unemployment and where one in two families are
impoverished, the extensive welfare projects of Hamas stand in stark contrast to the
perceived inefficiency and corruption that plagued the PNA in the late 1990s. Thus, a
secular in Gaza stated that ‘the authority is rotten. Hamas is serious’ (The Economist,
December 1st-7th 2001, p. 41). These factors, combined with Israel’s re-occupation of
large parts of the West Bank towns in April 2002 and the following destruction of
administrative and physical infrastructure, have eroded the centralised power of the
PNA. The executive’s personal position among Palestinians is also substantially
weakened.
Within this scenario the ongoing intifada and Israel’s re-occupation of the West Bank
may lead to a further fractioning of Palestine. Such a development seems to be in line
with the Sharon Government’s policy: To establish competing ‘bantustans’ or districts
in the Palestinian areas ruled by chiefs compliant to Israel. However, a more likely
outcome of further erosion of the PNA is the establishment of non-compliant,
uncompromising districts. Therefore, the establishment of a developmental Palestinian
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state, with a strong central government body, is probably the only guaranty for a
lasting peace. This also requires a more balanced structure of the economic relations
between Israel and Palestine and, thus, substantial revisions of the Protocol of
Economic Relations. Otherwise, Israel will continue to rely on its vast military force
and substantial - but volatile - US economic and political support.
For the PNA, the challenge is to re-establish its legitimacy. This legitimacy is partly
based on its ability to deal with issues such as financial mismanagement and
corruption, and its capability to provide security and basic services to the population
and to maintain physical infrastructure. In the short term, the re-construction and
service provision will require substantial external assistance. In the longer term,
however, sustainable development requires more reliance on domestic resources. Time
will show whether a reformed PNA is able to challenge the factors constraining
domestic revenue mobilisation and to enter into more reciprocal relationships with the
citizens, or whether it will seek the relatively easy alternative and resort on continued
foreign aid.
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Appendix: The tax system in Palestine
1 Introduction
This appendix describes the structure of the tax system in the Palestinian Authorities
during the period 1995-2000. The presentation covers the major bases and rates, the
legal basis for the tax system and the administrative apparatus responsible for
enforcing the tax laws at both central and local levels. It is conventional to distinguish
direct from indirect taxation. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English
defines an indirect tax as one ‘paid by consumer in form of increased price for taxed
goods’. The dictionary defines a direct tax as one ‘levied on persons who bears the
ultimate burden of tax, e.g. income tax, but not value added (tax)’. In a world in which
the incidence of taxation is an issue of complexity, such definitions are difficult to
sustain. In general, the distinction between direct and indirect taxes reflects at least
three different aspects of tax structures:
· the choice between taxes on income and taxes on consumption;
· the choice between taxes on commodities and taxes on individuals; and
· the choice between a source of origin and a destination basis for taxation.
Without elaborating these distinctions any further, we will follow the categorisation of
taxes used by the Palestinian Ministry of Finance when describing the tax system.
The appendix is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of direct taxes,
emphasising corporate and personal income taxes. The present structure of indirect
taxes on domestic goods and services (VAT, excises, etc.) is presented in section 3.
Taxes on international trade are discussed in section 4. In section 5, property taxes are
presented, followed by a discussion of non-tax revenues in section 6. Finally, in section
7 the local government tax structure is briefly presented.
2 Income taxes on individuals and companies
Revenues from income taxes during the period 1995-2000 are summarised in Table 1.
The relative share of income tax revenue of total revenue (excluding donations
disbursed) declined from 11.6% in 1995 to 8.2% in 1999, and was estimated to be
around 8.3% in the year 2000. Moreover, the bulk of these taxes (91.6% in 1999)
were collected by the PNA. The fluctuations of income tax revenues were partly
attributed to the fluctuations of income tax revenues from Palestinian workers in Israel,
and partly to the general decline in business activity in the Palestinian territories caused
by the political instability. The income tax revenue/GNP ratio was low, but not very
different from the average for Middle East Arab countries.
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Table 1: Income tax revenues of the PNA for the period 1995-2000 (in million USD)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Domestic income tax revenue 44.4 52.8 65.7 68.2 74.9 n.a.
Income tax clearance with Israel 5 4.1 5.2 9.2 6.3 n.a.
Total income tax revenue 49.4 56.9 70.9 77.4 81.2 80.2
Income tax clearance with Israel in % of
total income taxes
10.1 7.2 9.1 13.5 8.4 n.a.
Income tax revenues in % of total tax
revenues*
11.6 8.3 8.6 9.0 8.2 8.3
Income tax revenues in % of GNP** 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6
* Total revenue excludes grants, donations and loans.
** GNP-figures are from World Bank (2001). The use of these figures as a denominator is based on the
argument that that taxes on incomes generated outside Palestine are included in total revenue. Some of the
figures are translated from New Israeli Shekel into dollars using the exchange rate as published in World Bank
(2000).
Sources: (1) Palestinian National Authority (2000) and World Bank (2001). Figures for 1995 are Ministry of
Finance estimates.
2.1 The legal basis
The central government income tax structure in Palestine is founded in the Income Tax
Act No. 250 of 1964 (i.e., the Jordanian law applicable in the West Bank
Governorates) and the Income Tax Act No. 13 of 1947 (i.e., the law applicable to the
Gaza Strip Governorates), and the agreements reached with Israel in this respect. These
two acts have some major differences that are outlined in Table 2. Most of these
differences, however, have been subject to unification of the tax codes in the two areas
in the new Income Tax Act that was approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council in
2000, but not yet implemented due to the Israeli destruction of the PNA’s
infrastructure in April 2002. It should also be noted that the tax system in East
Jerusalem is that of Israel.
Table 2: Differences between applicable income tax acts in the West Bank & Gaza Strip
No. Subject The Income Tax Act (No. 25) of
1964 applicable in the WB
The Income Tax Act (No. 13) of
1947 applicable in the GS
1 Income earned outside
Palestine and transferred
to Palestine
Non-taxable income Taxable income only if the
transferee stays in Palestine for
more than six months during the
tax year
2 Income from agricultural
branches
Non-taxable income Taxable income
3 Tax for ltd. Companies 38.5% of profit 37.5% of profit
4 Spouse income Added to the other spouse’s income Considered independent of the
other spouse’s income
5 Life insurance, savings
and individual premiums
and instalments
5% of the value of premiums or
instalments is tax credit for a
maximum of 100 NIS* per annum
The value of premiums or
instalments is deducted as
expenses for a maximum of 1/6 of
the taxable income, provided that
the deducted amount does not
exceed 150 NIS per annum
* NIS: New Israeli Shekel = 4 USD (per 2000).
Source: PNA (1997:8).
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2.2 Personal income tax brackets
The Income Tax Act specify 8 tax brackets, with the tax rate increasing by 5% from one step
to the next. It is under consideration to reduce the number of tax brackets to 4 and the
maximum income tax rate to 20%. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has approved
the new law in its second reading and it was to be discussed in its final reading to become
effective in 2001. But, the second Intifada since late September 2000 has created a situation
that makes it difficult for the PLC to convene and pass laws or amendments. Therefore, the
new tax brackets and rates were made applicable per decree without waiting for the new law
to be passed by the PLC.
Table 3: Palestinian personal income tax schedule (in effect since January 1995)
Annual Taxable Income
(JD)*
Tax Rate
(%)
Newly Approved Tax
Brackets** (JD)
(Under consideration)
Newly Approved
Tax Rates** (%)
1-724 5 1-5000 5
725-1810 10 5001-10000 10
1811-2897 15 10001-20000 15
2898-5069 20 20001 + 20
5070-8690 30
8691-14483 35
14484-25345 40
25346 and more 48
Notes: * 1 USD = 0.71 JD (Jordanian Dinar). Based on this rate, income tax brackets were recalculated
from the original table in the Income Tax Guide where figures are in NIS. We applied an exchange rate
of 1JD = 5.8 NIS.
** These are the income tax brackets (in Jordanian Dinar) and rates that have been approved in the new
tax law initially planned to become effective from 2001.
Source: PLC (2000)
2.3 Income tax deductions
Deductions are generous and will become even more generous when the new income
tax law becomes effective. Table 4 lists the main deductions used to calculate the
taxable income of individuals.
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Table 4: Deductions from the individual income tax
No. Existing Deductions New deductions under
consideration
1 JD 724 for residency JD 1500
2 JD 435 for a non-working wife JD 500
3 JD 145 for every child JD 500
4 JD 217 for each dependent JD 500
5 JD 724 for a university student JD 2500
6 20% of the gross salary of an employee in the private
and public sectors
35%
7 50% of the value of residential rent up to JD 1380 Without a percentage and is up to JD
1800
Note: Original amounts were in NIS and were changed into JD by using the exchange rate of 1JD =
NIS5.8.
Source: PNA (1997:20).
The new deductions are stipulated in the proposed law. Deductions number 2, 3 and 4
are all unified in one category called (family allowance deduction). Expenses like
medical expenses are deductible provided that they do not exceed the taxable income
and official documents (receipts etc.) are presented.
The Income Tax Department in the Ministry of Finance distinguishes between four
categories of tax collections:
· Deductions at source: These include deductions from wages and salaries and 5% of
the value of any commercial transaction whose value is more than NIS 500
(equivalent to JD 87).
· Individuals and companies: Include persons and firms that pay taxes in instalments
over the year.
· Cars:  Include all taxpayers who own cars and use them for income generating
activities. Taxes are not imposed on income earned, but as a lump sum of 2% of
the book value of the car according to the type of car (i.e., taxis, trucks, buses, etc.).
· Transfers: Include income taxes paid by Palestinians working in Israel and Israeli
settlements, and transferred by Israel.
2.4 Corporate income taxes
The tax base is corporate profits. The tax rates are 38.5% of net profits in the West
Bank and 37.5% in the Gaza Strip (see Table 2).
The new rates that have been approved in the second reading of the proposed law by
the PLC are:37
· 10% for industrial companies, hotels and hospitals;
· 15% for private or public limited corporations; and
· 20% for banks, exchange bureaus, and financial intermediation companies.38
                                           
37 Law Proposal on Income Tax Law as approved in its first reading by the PLC in September 2000,
Chapter 5, Article 16, p. 4.
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2.5 Tax exemptions
Exemptions can be granted according to the Investment Encouragement Law (No. 1
from 1998).39 The most important of these exemptions are:
(1) Five years exemption for a project with a paid-up capital of more than USD 100000
and less than USD 1 million starting from the year of production. Such projects can
also enjoy a lower corporate profit tax of 10% on net profit for 8 MORE years.
(2) Five years exemption for a project with a paid-up capital of more than USD 1
million and up to USD 5 million starting from the year of production. Such projects
can also enjoy a lower corporate profit tax of 10% on net profit for another 12
years.
(3) Five years exemption for a project with a paid-up capital of more than USD 5
million starting from the year of production. Such projects can also enjoy a lower
corporate profit tax of 10% on net profit for 16 more years.
(4) The Board of the PHAEI may ask the Council of Ministers to grant certain projects
additional exemptions depending on their nature and the needs and development
priorities of the Palestinian economy. Such projects an also enjoy a lower profit tax
of 10% on net profit for additional 20 years.
Exemptions can be extended for an additional period of no more than 5 years based on
the recommendation of the PHAEI. In all cases this grace period can be extended to an
additional period of two years if the local content exceeds 60% exclusive investments
in land and buildings.
3 Taxes on domestic goods and services
These taxes include VAT, purchase tax and fuel tax. With respect to revenues, they are
the most important taxes for the PNA (see Table 5). In addition, there is a production
tax on the wholesale prices of domestically produced goods, but the revenues from this
tax are insignificant. Value Added Tax (VAT) is the most important of these taxes with
respect to revenue generation. VAT was introduced by Israel in the 1970s and is
included in the Paris Protocol (PP). The general VAT-rate is 17%. However, exports,
tourist services, fruit and vegetables are zero-rated. According to the Paris Protocol, the
PNA can apply a rate of 15% on specific goods and services if it deems necessary, but
has not used this option yet. VAT revenues on goods and services imported via or from
Israel are collected by the Israeli revenue authority and transferred to the PNA upon
the handing of the unified VAT vouchers.
Revenues from VAT and excises collected domestically and those collected through the
clearance system with Israel are summarised in Table 5. Combined these taxes
contributed with about 10% of GDP. Thus, these sources contribute substantially more
to total tax revenues (47.7% in 1999) than income taxes (8.2%). They are also more
important than revenues from taxes on international transactions (30.3% in 1999, see
                                                                                                                                       
38 Value added tax (VAT) is also imposed on banks and financial companies at 17% on the total wage
bill and on net profits of the financial institution. This is in accordance with the Israeli tradition to
include financial services in the VAT system.
39 Ministry of Economy and Trade (1998); Investment Encouragement Law, Article 23, pp. 18-19.
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Table 7). In recent years, however, revenues from indirect taxes on domestic goods and
services have steadily declined, from about 66% of total tax revenues in 1995, to less
than 48% in 1999. Furthermore, the importance of the domestically collected indirect
taxes has increased relatively to those collected through the clearance system with
Israel. But, still by the end of 1999 more than 70% of these taxes were collected by
Israel.
Table 5: VAT, excises and fuel tax for the period 1995-1999 (in million USD)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1) Domestic VAT 55.8 66 74.6 80.3 89.9
(2) Domestic Excises 0 36.8 47.3 50.4 48.1
(3) Total VAT and excises collected
by PNA (1+2)
55.8 102.8 121.9 130.7 138
(4) VAT through clearance 191.9 217.3 215.3 201.6 233.3
(5) Fuel excise through clearance 33.5 100.6 110.7 106.6 100.7
(6) Total VAT and excises through
clearance with Israel (4+5)
225.4 317.9 326 308.2 334
(7) Total VAT, excises and fuel taxes
(3+6)
281.2 420.7 447.9 438.9 472
Indirect taxes on domestic goods and
services collected by clearance with
Israel in % of total indirect taxes (ratio
of 6/7)
80.2 75.6 72.8 70.2 70.8
Indirect taxes on domestic goods and
services in % of total tax revenues
(ratio of 7/total revenue of the PA)
66 61.2 54.6 51 47.7
Indirect taxes on domestic goods and
services in % of GDP (ratio of 7/GDP)
7.8 11.3 11.3 10.4 10.9
Source: Palestinian National Authority (2000)
3.1 Value added tax
Collection of VAT depends on the classification of the business establishment
according to turnover. The VAT Department has classified three kinds of
establishments as follows:
(1) Licensed establishments with sales of NIS 185 000 (almost USD 46 250) or more.
(2) Small establishments with sales between NIS 42 000-185 000 (USD 10 500 -
46259).
(3) Exempted establishments with sales below NIS 42 000 (USD 10 500).
Establishments with annual sales of more than NIS 365 000 (approximately USD 91
250) pay taxes every month, while those with sales below that figure pay taxes every
two months. Financial institutions pay 17% on both salaries of employees and net
profits. Firms whose annual sales are less than NIS 42,000 do not pay VAT. These
revenues together with VAT on imported goods and services are collected by the VAT
Department of the PNA. VAT on goods and services imported via Israel or from Israel
are, however, collected by the Israeli revenue authorities and transferred to the PNA
upon the handing of the unified VAT vouchers.
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3.2 Purchase (excise) tax
The base of this tax is the wholesale prices of consumer goods and some types of raw
materials and processed goods. The rates range from 5%-95%. Table 6 presents the
rates on selected goods.
Table 6: Purchase tax rates for selected goods
Item Purchase Tax Rate
Cigarettes 51.5% + 37.5 NIS on each quantity of 1000
Alcohol 5%, 10%, or 20% according to alcohol content
Chemicals 5%-10%
Cars 95%
Electric Equipment 10%
Stones 10%
Source: Ministry of Finance, Ramallah.
There are some exemptions of this tax, but these are conditional to certain products in
the education, health, industry and agricultural sectors. They also apply to some
companies covered by exemptions under the Investment Encouragement Law.
3.3 Fuel Tax
The tax base is the purchases of fuel products. There is a specific rate in NIS for 1000
litre updated every three months, according to the rise in consumer prices. Fuel tax
shall, according to the tax law, be transferred to local governments. However, this is
not the case in the PNA. Instead, the proceeds are transferred to a special account
outside the control of the Ministry of Finance. This practice has been a matter of
concern for the public, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and
the donor community. Thus, the Progress Report on the Economic Policy Framework40
stresses this issue and demands a stop to the diversion of excise revenues to accounts
outside the control of the Ministry of Finance starting from January 1, 2000. However,
by end 2000 only about two-thirds of almost USD 70 million for each of the years
1998 and 1999 had been refunded to the Ministry of Finance.
The rates of the fuel tax vary depending on the type of fuel. For example, the rates that
were applicable from 1 January - 31 March 199641, were NIS 1375 per 1000 litre of
gasoline 91 octane, NIS 1450 per 1000 litre of gasoline 96 octane, NIS 82.44 per 1000
litre of diesel oil or of kerosene.
4 Taxes on international trade
Taxes on international trade are composed of customs duties and VAT and excises on
imported goods. The PNA has some power for direct collection when imports are from
or through Jordan or Egypt. However, trade with these countries is limited. Revenues
from taxes on international transactions collected by the PNA are therefore very small
                                           
40 The Palestinian National Authority Official Website: Events, West Bank and Gaza: Economic Policy
Framework, Progress Report (May 31, 2000:5).
41 The rate for a more recent period was not available for this review.
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(see Table 7). In 1999, almost 90% of the revenues from international trade were
collected by Israel.
Table 7: Revenue from taxes on international trade (in million USD)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1) Customs by the PNA 7.3 23 21.9 24.2 36.2
(2) Customs through the clearance system with Israel 18.9 87.1 142.7 205.3 263.3
(3) Total Customs 26.2 110.1 164.6 229.5 299.5
(4) Customs collected by Israel through the clearance
system in % of total Customs (ratio of 2/3)
72.1 79.1 86.7 89.5 87.9
(5) Customs in % of total revenue (ratio of 3 to total
revenue)
6.2 16 20 26.7 30.3
(6) Customs in % of GDP (ratio of 3 to GDP) 0.7 2.9 4.2 5.4 6.9
Source: Palestinian National Authority (2000).
Although the nominal value of customs collected by the PNA in 1999 has increased 5
times its 1995-level, its share of total tax revenues is limited. It has declined steadily
from 28% in 1995 to about 12% in 1999 (see row (4) in Table 7). This is mainly due
to the fact that trade with Egypt and Jordan has remained at a low level compared to
trade with or through Israel which experienced a substantial increase till September
2000. Furthermore, total revenues from customs in percent of total tax revenue have
increased rapidly from 6% in 1995 to more than 30% in 1999. The corresponding
figures for the ratio of customs revenue to GDP are less than 1% for 1995 and about
7% for 1999. The trend of increasing customs revenues through the clearing system
with Israel reflects that the economic dependency on Israel has increased during the
period 1995-2000, despite efforts from the PNA to reverse the trend.
The rates on customs duties are levied on the c.i.f. value of imported goods and
services. The general rates are about 50%, except for cars and transportation vehicles
for which it is 95%. The PNA has the right to charge lower rates on two lists of goods
as specified in the Paris Protocol (PP). In addition, comes the VAT rate of 17%. There
is also a purchase tax, which is levied on the c.i.f. value of the imports plus customs
plus TAMA. The rates of this tax vary from 5% to 240%.42 There are a few
exemptions, and these are mainly to enterprises under the privilege of the Investment
Encouragement Law.
5 Property Taxes
The base for property taxes in the West Bank (WB) and the Gaza Strip (GS) varies.
Building and non-farm lands within municipalities in the WB are subject to property
taxes of 17% of the net annual rental value of the property (defined as 80% of the
total rental value), and 15% in the GS. Properties outside the municipalities are subject
to property taxes of 10% of the annual rental value. Farmland is subject to a tax of 6
                                           
42 TAMA is a procedure of calculation that reflects domestic wholesale price as the basis for valuation.
Israel has recently abolished this tax on many items, with negative impacts on revenues transferred from
Israel to the PNA.
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USD per donum in the WB and 15% of the annual rental value in the GS as long as the
land is developed (i.e., planted with fruits and/or vegetables). However, for farmland
the property tax rates may vary according to the crop.
Property taxes are collected by the central government. On the West Bank 90% of the
revenues are transferred to the municipalities. In the Gaza Strip, however, all property
tax collections are retained at the central level. Gaza municipalities therefore levy
additional property-related taxes, such as Gaza City’s housing/room tax. In January
2001, the Ministry of Finance decided to transfer the responsibility of the collection of
property taxes to the local government bodies in response to their demands43.
Revenues from property taxes are insignificant when compared to total tax revenues.
In 1999, they contributed with only 0.15% of total tax revenues (see Table 8). But, the
revenue figures do not reflect the fact that most Palestinians keep their wealth in the
form of property. However, they do reflect both the regressivity of the tax system and
the narrow tax base which the PNA rules over. Table 8 summarises the trend of this
revenue source. The table shows that the contribution of the tax to total revenues has
fluctuated very much in recent years. This may also explain why the Ministry of
Finance supported the proposal of handing over the responsibility of this tax to local
authorities.
Table 8: Property tax revenue of the PNA,  1995-1999
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Property tax revenue (in million USD) 0.7 0.94 0.58 0.53 1.5
In % of total revenue 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.15
Source: Palestinian National Authority (2000)
6 Non-tax revenue
In addition to the various types of taxes the PNA collects fees and charges. These
include transportation fees, car registration fees, health fees and insurances, and
business fees. Some of these are directly collected by the relevant offices of the PNA,
while others are transferred by Israel after they have been deducted from the wages of
Palestinians working in Israel. The role of non-tax revenue clearance with Israel is,
however, limited, and it fluctuates according to the number of Palestinian workers
allowed at any time to work in Israel. Table 9 provides a summary of revenues
generated from these fees and charges. In 1999, they contributed with more than 13%
of total domestic revenues, equivalent to 3.1% of GDP.
                                           
43 Al-Ayyam Newspaper, January 11, 2001, p. 5.
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Table 9: Fees and charges collected by the PNA and through the revenue clearance system
with Israel, 1995-1999 (in million USD)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1) Local non-tax revenue 50.2 86.2 117.6 96.6 114
        Transportation Fees 11.1 22.6 32.3 28.9 28.3
        Heath Insurance 12.7 12.6 12.7 14.4 20.1
        Heath Fees 11.9 9.4 10.1 10.2 9.2
        Other local non-tax revenue * 14.6 34.6 62.5 43.1 56.5
(2) Non-tax revenue clearance 17.1 12.2 19.6 17.9 20.5
        Health Fees 10 6.3 8.1 9.2 8.7
        Other non-tax revenue 7.1 5.9 11.5 8.7 11.8
(3) Total non-tax revenue 67.3 98.4 137.2 114.5 134.5
(4) Ratio of (3) to total revenue 0.158 0.143 0.167 0.133 0.136
(5) Ratio of (3) to GDP 0.019 0.026 0.018 0.027 0.031
Note: * A major part of these ‘other non-tax revenue’ includes business fees and cars registration fees.
Source: Palestinian National Authority (2000)
 7 The local government tax structure44
A primary function of local authorities is to provide services, in particular water and
electricity. User fees from water and electricity utilities are the major revenue sources
for many municipalities. Revenue bases vary substantially between municipalities. In
some local authorities, for instance, fees and charges do not match the costs of
delivering the services. For instance, personnel involved in the World Bank’s
Municipalities Institutional Development Program (MIDP) have estimated that fees for
municipal waste collection and disposal recover as little as one tenth of the actual costs
incurred (World Bank, 1999).45
Non-utility revenues of municipalities come from a variety of sources. The most
important is a property tax on the net rental value of land and buildings and defined as
80% of the total rental value. The property tax rate is, as noted above, 17% in the
West Bank and 10%-15% in the Gaza Strip. Collected by the Ministry of Finance,
90% of the revenue is returned to West Bank municipalities. In Gaza, all property tax
collections are retained at the central level. However, Gaza municipalities levy
additional property-related taxes, such as Gaza City’s housing/room tax.
West Bank municipalities also levy a local education tax equivalent to 7% of the net
rental base, i.e., the same base as the property tax. The net proceeds of the education
levy are used to finance school construction, maintenance and textbooks. These are
areas in which central funding falls short of local needs. A separate “school”
committee administers the education tax. Thus, revenues and expenditures associated
                                           
44 This section draws on the World Bank (1999:49-51).
45 It has proved difficult to get data on the relative importance of municipal taxes, fees and charges in the
various local authorities. The available data is not categorised in a way that permits such an analysis.
Moreover, to our knowledge, disaggregated data on local government revenues is not available. This is a
statistical gap that the Ministry of Finance or the PCBS ought to cover when rebuilding the statistical
material on Palestine.
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with the education tax do not appear in the municipal accounts. Because it is collected
locally on the same base as the property tax, administration is also duplicated.
Moreover, the Ministry of Finance collects an occupation tax on businesses and
professions in both the West Bank and Gaza strip, and remits 90% of the proceeds to
municipalities, retaining 10% to defray collection costs. Rates vary by nature, size and
location of the business. Furthermore, from 1998 onward, the central government is
obliged under the 1997 Local Government Act to share revenues from the motor
vehicle licenses and traffic fines with the municipalities of origin. As of August 1999,
transfers for 1998 had only been made to some Gaza local authorities, although it was
anticipated that all the local governments in Gaza would have received these transfers
by September 1999. As of August 1999, transfers to the West Bank local governments
were being delayed until an arrangement for dealing with municipal arrears to Israeli
utilities had been reached.
About 75% of local government non-utility revenue comes from various charges, fees
and profits from local enterprises, of which the most important source is building
licenses. Because local revenues from property and occupation taxes are primarily
controlled by the central government, and because there are few alternative revenue-
raising options, some local governments have establish commercial ventures.
Still, the lack of a major broad-based local tax and the heavy reliance upon a few own-
revenue sources present a serious concern for the financing of local authorities. The
mismatch between local revenues and expenditure requirements may suggest a need for
revenue restructuring and greater autonomy in setting tax policy. However, experiences
from other developing countries, suggest that increased local government autonomy
with respect to taxation, needs cautious supervision from above to avoid double
taxation and inconsistencies between policies implemented at the local level and the
national government’s development policies (Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2000). There are
also ongoing initiatives to create regional self-financing water, wastewater and
electricity utilities. While such facilities may relieve local governments of distributing
these services, this might also imply that some local authorities loose their most
important income bases. Thus, the PNA and the World Bank have discussed the need
to introduce equalisation grants from the central level to finance local services across
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Given the current economic situation, it is, however,
unrealistic that such a transfer system can be put in place without substantial external
donor funding.
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